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The Role of Revenue Volatility in Local Expenditure Volatility:  
A Comparison of Tokyo Metropolitan Local Governments 
Abstract 
Local expenditure volatility can have significant implications for the health of 
local economies. It is therefore essential to understand how fluctuations in the 
various components of municipal revenue translate into expenditure volatility. 
We examine the association between revenue and expenditure volatility for 
Tokyo Metropolitan Governments – which are comprised of both Special Wards 
and Tama Cities – through recourse to a six-year panel of fiscal data (2010 to 
2015 inclusive). We find evidence of statistically significant positive 
associations between the volatility of most local taxes and expenditure volatility, 
but negative associations between the volatility of grants and expenditure 
volatility. This suggests that grants play an important role in smoothing out 
local government expenditures in Tokyo and that the prescription for greater 
reliance on local taxation, found in much of the literature, may not be 
appropriate for Japanese local governments.  
Keywords: revenue volatility, local expenditure volatility, Tokyo Metropolitan 
local governments, Special wards, Tama cities. 
1. Introduction      
There has been much recent attention on decentralisation of government in most advanced 
economies in response to a widespread belief that fiscal decentralisation reforms – assigning 
autonomy from the central government to local governments in terms of raising revenues and 
controlling expenditures – can offer potential gains in economic growth (Martinez-Vazrquez 
& McNab, 2003), social welfare improvement (McLure & Mazrtinez-Varquez, 20001), and 
efficient provision of public services (Oates, 2008; Martinez-Vazrquez & McNab, 2003). 
Fiscal decentralisation principally relates to matters of revenue raising and taxation powers, 
decisions on spending, and intergovernmental relations (Vo, 2010). The merit of fiscal 
decentralisation has been shown in recent empirical studies: In particular, it has been asserted 
that 'more tax autonomy would improve the budget of all tiers of government' and 
expenditure decentralisation could improve responsiveness in the face of financial crises or 
economic shocks (Bartolini et al., 2017). Moreover, as pointed out by Foremy (2014), tax 
decentralisation can help sub-national governments to avoid deficits (and this has been 
shown for several European countries), while expenditure decentralisation can help to reduce 
regional income disparities (Sacchi & Salotti, 2016). However, because devolution of 
autonomy falls most heavily upon local governments, there may be unanticipated 
consequences for this tier of government (Tanzi, 2001) and it is, therefore, important to 
empirically investigate expenditure volatility for local government systems. 
In some countries, the devolution of spending responsibilities is not matched by 
corresponding devolution of tax revenues and this can exacerbate vertical fiscal imbalance 
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(Eyraud & Lusinyan, 2011). According to McLure and Martinez-Vazquez (2000), it is 
important to clearly determine expenditure portfolios in advance before designing revenue 
assignments and transfers, to ensure that local governments have adequate revenues to match 
expenditure responsibilities. There is evidence to suggest that residents are increasingly 
demanding more public services, thus expanding local expenditures, despite low willingness 
to pay (Eyraud & Lysinyan, 2011; Grant & Drew 2017, p.274). If this is indeed the case, the 
other sources of revenue (and other cash flows) may hence be required to match 
expenditures. Thus, there is good reason for supposing that the variance of taxes and transfers 
might be related to local spending, but few scholarly studies, so far, have explored the 
potential associations. 
In general, measures of volatility can provide a picture of an entity's economic progress 
since this approach allows for an understanding of the fluctuations from equilibrium (Staley, 
2017). The volatility of revenue and expenditureExpenditure volatility is, hence, defined as 
the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of revenue and expenditure deviating from 
equilibrium over the yearslocal spending for a given fiscal year (Staley, 2015; Sacchi and 
Salotti, 2017).  Research on expenditure volatility at the local level is particularly salient, 
given the need for local authorities and policymakers to arrive at efficacious public policy 
prescriptions. For instance, Sacchi and Salotti (2017) argue that local spending volatility 
probably impedes the health of local economies. If expenditure tends to be volatile and 
unpredictable, then it makes it hard for local business to plan their spending (with respect to 
staffing needs, inventory and the like). This is especially the case if local government staff 
numbers are volatile – which is likely to be felt most keenly by casualised staff  ̶  because 
less money is being injected into the local economy. Moreover, expenditure volatility, even 
revenue volatility, might give rise to uncertainty concerning future fiscal periods, which will 
hamper the 'selection of efficient production processes' (Crain, 2003, p.96). Local 
expenditure volatility is thus worthy of study given its implications for local economic 
performance.  
The nascent scholarly literature on expenditure volatility and some of its determinants has 
identifiedexpenditure has identified some of its determinants.volatility has identified some of 
the determinants of same. Potential determinants of expenditure volatility can be attributable 
to variation in taxes and intergovernmental grants (Sacchi & Salotti, 2017), the degree of 
fiscal decentralisation in most developed and developing countries (Furceri et al., 2016), the 
quality of fiscal institutions (Albuquerque, 2011), and revenues and debt outstanding 
(Dension & Guo, 2015).  However, these academic works have largely been focused on 
Europe and America, and there is a gap in the scholarly literature relating to the local 
expenditure volatility in Japan, which is generally considered to have the highest degree of 
decentralisation among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries (Mochida, 2008). Our paper is motivated by a desire to address this gap, 
especially concerning business cycle fluctuations in the Tokyo metropolis sequent to the 
2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC).   
Japan is a unitary democracy that has vigorously implemented fiscal decentralisation 
reforms − marked by the “Trininty Reform” in 2004 regarding the amendment of earmarked 
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grants, local taxes, and national subsidies, and accordingly improved the central-local 
relationship. However, local governments are still somewhat reliant on intergovernmental 
transfers and are restricted in terms of tax administration, as well as being subject to 
borrowing controls (Mochida, 2008). At the prefectural level, Tokyo metropolis, governed by 
the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG), is a particularly important jurisdiction to study 
for a number of reasons. First, Tokyo is the locomotive of Japan’s economy, contributing to 
19.5% (JPY 92 trillion) of Japan Gross Domestic Product in 2014  ̶  the highest portion of the 
prefectural contribution to the national economy (Bureau of Finance, 2014). Second, Tokyo’s 
economy suffered from the 2008 GFC, and consequently, local taxes plummeted by as much 
as 20% of total revenue (JPY 1 trillion) in 2009 (see Figure 1). In responsive to the GFC, the 
TMG executed staff-cuts and implemented controls to public spending in the pursuit of 
financial soundness (Bureau of Finance, 2014). Third, there exist two disparate public 
administration systems within Tokyo local governments: 23 special wards and 26 cities 
(Tama area). 23 wards in the special urban area (Special wards) and 26 cities in the suburban 
area of western Tokyo (Tama cities). Under the Local Autonomy Law, while the former are 
categorized as special public entities  ̶  enjoying some privileged financial coordinating 
grants from TMG to compensate the fiscal gap – the later are ordinary public entities, similar 
to other municipalities in Japan (Ohsugi, 2011). Additionally, the special wards are virtually 
limited in some public service responsibilities (e.g., fire prevention, water supply, and 
sewerage system), which are governed by TMG on their behalf (CLAIR, 2013; Ohsugi, 
2011) . This unique fiscal system of Tokyo is our focus.  
In this study, we examine: (i) the association between the volatility of various revenues 
(e.g., local taxes and grants) and local spending volatility, and (ii) how the fiscal differences 
between special wards and cities affect the spending volatility in the context following the 
GFC in 2008. To do so, we employ fixed effects regression analysis over a six-year panel of 
data (2010 to 2015).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, the related 
literature on Japan's fiscal decentralisation and Tokyo public finance will be introduced. 
Thereafter, we outline our empirical strategy and the data for analysis. Following this, we 
discuss the statistical results and findings. We conclude with a discussion on the public 
policy implications arising from this study.   
2. Tokyo Local Government Remit, Revenue, and Expenditure  
Local government in Japan is organised according to two-tiers: Prefectures and 
municipalities. At the prefectural level, Tokyo Metropolitan Government administratively 
governs Tokyo metropolis. At the municipal level, there are 23 special wards, 26 cities, 5 
towns, and 8 villages1there are 49 administrative units, composed of 23 wards and 26 cities. 
The Tokyo metropolis covers an area of 2.191 square km and has an estimated population of 
                                                          
1 The 5 towns and 8 villages  ̶  rural and island areas in Tokyo   ̶  are designated in the geographical area, but 
their scopes of public services and finances performed by them are comparatively smallminuscule as compared 
with those provided by the special wards and cities. Therefore, we eliminated these units from our 





13.491 million as at October 2015 (TMG, 2018). While 9.241 million reside at the 23 wards 
with the population density of 14,746 persons per square km, 4.233 million live in 26 cities 
with 3,640 persons per square km (TMG, 2018).  
In Japan, the national and local government assignment of responsibilities was clarified by 
the Omnibus Local Autonomy Law in 1999. The abolition of the system of delegated 
functions, and a representative agency as a head of the municipality appointed by the national 
government, lead to the elimination of intervention by the national government, and hence, 
local governments now have broad responsibilities for their administrative functions 
autonomously and comprehensively (CLAIR, 2013; Mochida, 2008). Prefectures are 
responsible for prefectural roads, high schools, public health centres, and police, whereas 
municipalities are responsible for urban planning, municipal streets, schooling for under 15, 
health care services, social welfare, garbage disposal, and fire services. In contrast to the 26 
cities' responsibilities for public services, several public provisions such as water supply, 
sewerage, and fire protection in the 23 wards are co-shared and undertaken by TMG (TMG, 
2018). Thus, an incorporated council between TMG and special wards has been established 
to facilitate continuous negotiations and discussions on the matters of co-sharing activities 
and other fiscal interrelation (TMG, 2018). Therefore, the relationship between TMG and 
special wards can be considered unique and mutually interdependent.  
The primary local revenue sources for Japanese local governments are local taxes, 
intergovernmental grants, and local bonds. Local taxes are imposed by both prefectural and 
municipal governments with various types of taxes: inhabitant, business, consumption, and 
property tax, etc. In general, tax bases and tax rates are regulated consistently across local 
governments. Intergovernmental grants are composed of Central Government Subsidies 
(CGS) and Local Allocation Tax (LAT). The CGS, also known as the National Treasury 
Disbursement, is an obligatory share from the national government for specific purposes 
(e.g., educational assistance, post-natural disaster alleviation) (Bessho, 2016; MIC, 2017). 
The LAT, allocated as a fixed portion of national taxes such as income, corporate, alcohol, 
and consumption, plays an essential role for horizontal fiscal equivalence to narrow the gap 
between poor and affluent regions. Tokyo is such a wealthy region (the income per capita 
exceeds the national fiscal standard) that LAT grants are not allocated to municipals in 
Tokyo (MIC, 2017). However, they are still recipients of LAT grants from TMG. The LAT is 
estimated by the gap between basic fiscal needs and basic fiscal revenues. Finally, the 
Japanese principle of local autonomy allows local governments the authority to issue bonds 
(Tanaka, 2011). Local bonds perform a deficit adjusting function, thus shifting the debt 
burden to the next generation, and augmenting general revenue sources (Tanaka, 2011).  
[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Importantly for this study, there exist two main differences in the revenue-raising powers 
of the 23 wards and 26 cities. Regarding local taxes, there are sixteen types of charges for the 
23 wards, but twenty-two for the cities (TMG, 2018). Moreover, the rate of corporation tax in 
the special wards is around four times larger than the rate imposed in the cities (Bureau of 




acquisition and holding tax) are collected by TMG on behalf of the special wards, while each 
city collects these taxes by themselves (Ohsugi, 2011). TMG separates the pool of these taxes 
collected for two functions: 55 percentage for grant allocations towards special wards and 45 
percentage for co-sharing administrative works.  The funds of grants are further divided into 
special grants (5%) and ordinary grants (95%). Special wards receive the financial 
coordinating grants from TMG, while cities do not. Therefore, special wards differ from 
cities regarding revenue sources. 
The volatility of revenue and expenditure has been increasingly attracting the attention of 
scholars. On the revenue side, constant fluctuation of income can make it hard for local 
authorities and policymakers to plan, budget, and provide efficient and sustainable goods and 
services (Staley, 2017). Thus, it is considered essential to identify the factors affecting 
revenue volatility. For instance, tax limitations are positively linked with state revenue 
volatility in America (Staley, 2017; 2015). Moreover, the empirical study of Afonso (2017) 
asserts that greater reliance on local sales tax can increase the volatility of own source 
revenue, whereas more significant reliance on property tax can decrease the volatility of 
individual source revenue, consistent with the underlying theory of fiscal federalism (Oates, 
2011). Additionally, it has been shown that increasing property tax can reduce capital 
expenditures, which are not affected by local sales tax (Afonso, 2017).   
On the expenditure side, some critical factors have been identified. For example, as 
pointed out by Furceri (2007), and Afonso and Furceri (2010), the effect of government 
expenditure volatility on economic growth is generally negative and statistically significant 
for European countries. However, it seems that some advanced countries may be able to 
absorb expenditure volatility because of their better taxation system and powerful domestic 
stabilizers (Furceri, 2007). Similarly, Furceri and Poplawski-Ribeiro (2008) conclude that 
country size is negatively associated with government spending volatility, which is also 
consistent with the finding of Albuquerque (2011).  
However, there is only a nascent literature regarding factors contributing to expenditure 
volatility at the local level. Sacchi and Salotti (2017) have investigated the influence of local 
taxes (income tax, property tax, and sales tax) and grants on local spending volatility in 
twenty OECD countries. Their results suggest that while volatilities of grants and income tax 
are positively associated with local spending volatility, the volatility of property tax has a 
negative effect on spending. Another study of Denison and Gou (2015) elaborates on the 
association between outstanding debt and expenditure volatility for local jurisdictions of the 
United States and found that debt had a statistically significant impact on the expenditure 
volatility for thirteen states.  
The above literature suggests a number of factors that might be associated with revenue 
volatility and expenditure volatility. However, it also suggests that the relationship between 
revenue volatility and expenditure volatility is not uniform. Furthermore, only a few studies 
present a clear link between revenues and expenditure volatility, even though the importance 




unpredictable revenue growth causes all sorts of unpleasant governmental responses, most 
commonly manic-depressive patterns of spending and taxing.’ 
In addition to the studies from abroad, some related empirical studies such as Bessho and 
Ogawa (2015), and Martin-Rodiguez and Ogawa (2017) in the Japanese context investigated 
local fiscal adjustments and found that own-source revenue plays a limited role in balancing 
provincial budgets because it tends to be offset by the supply of grants. Subsequently, it has 
been suggested that municipalities can induce grants by expanding current expenditure. 
These scholarly works provide some insight into the fiscal deficit associated with own-source 
revenues, grants, and debt; however, the specific association between revenue and 
expenditure still requires investigation. Moreover, this association has not yet been examined 
in detail at the specific local level of Tokyo, where the public finance system is rather unique 
in Japan. (when compared with other local governments in Japan). To address these gaps in 
the literature, we analyse the association between the volatilities of various revenue 
components (e.g., local tax, grants) and expenditure volatility of local governments in Tokyo. 
The next section will outline the empirical strategy that we employ. 
3. Empirical Strategy 
Local expenditure volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the annual growth rate 
of local spending for a given fiscal year (Sacchi & Salotti, 2017). The measurement of 
volatility of revenue components is estimated in a similar manner. ApartIn contrast to  
fromthe Sacchi and Salotti (2017) model  ̶  which examineding the expenditure volatility of 
local governments in the context of OECD national levelstates – , our specification instead 
concentratedwas paid an attention on local governments at the regional level, particularlyin 
the context of Tokyo metropolitan government, Japan. Hence, several revenue components 
from the Sacchi and Salotti (2017) model wereare modified to reflect the circumstances of 
befit with thethe Tokyo local governments circumstances. Data were extracted from the cash-
based accounting system of 49 administrative units in Tokyo over six fiscal years from 2010 
to 2015, inclusive. Fixed effects panel regression for data analysis was adopted in this 
empirical study and is used because it controls for time-invariant latent variables that might 
influence the dependent variable. Although Random-Effect (RE) models might be more 
efficient, it needs to overcome the problem of a composite error that is possibly correlated 
with the explanatory variables (Drew & Dollery, 2016). According to Thompson and Gates 
(2007), there could be a potentialis a possibility that a feedback loop that the expenditure 
volatility could influence the revenue onemight operate between revenue and expenditure 
and readers should remain cognisant of this potential interaction when interpreting our results 
which are primarily . However, we primarily directed at investigating the association which 
runs from e into the translation from revenue to expenditure. Theherefore, tThe regression 
specification was estimated by the following equation:   
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Where independent variable is the annual volatility of municipality i expenditure at 
the period of t fiscal year. In the parsimonious model (1), the dependent variables  ̶   LTi,t, 
CTi,t, OTi,t, SGi,t, Gi,t, Si,t, FCi,t, ORi,t, and Bi,t  ̶  denote the volatility of local tax, consumption 
tax2 (ln), other taxes (ln), special grants, grants (ln), subsidies, fees and charges (ln), other 
revenues, and local bonds (ln), respectively (transformations were applied to correct skewed 
distributions where indicated).  The set of  (k =1,...,9) represents the estimated parameters 
in the regression model and µi,t  is an independent identically distributed random error term. 
To ensure the robustness of the results, we also controlled for municipal specific features 
under an alternative specification. Therefore, specification (2) with additional control 
variables has been proposed: 
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(2) 
In this study, we employ Full-Time-Employees (FTE) as a proxy for municipal size (Drew 
et al., 2016). This control variable is estimated by the natural logarithm of the number of 
FTE staff at each municipality i at year t.  Some relevant empirical studies use different sets 
of control variables for instance: population to measure country size, urbanization as a 
percentage of each municipal population over the total population, population density (Sacchi 
& Salloti, 2017), population older than 65, population growth rate, or unemployment rate3 
(Staley, 2017). The population-related control variables seem inappropriate for the Tokyo 
case. The main reason is that Tokyo metropolis has a unique distribution of population 
because Tokyo is located at the centre of the Greater Tokyo Area, surrounded by three 
neighbours ̶  Saitama, Chiba, and Kanagawa, which are the most populous areas in Japan. 
People in these neighbourhoods commute daily to their offices at the centre of Tokyo. 
Accordingly, Tokyo’s population gap between daytime and night-time was around 2.89 
million in 2010 (TMG, 2018). These commuters essentially export metropolitan corporation 
tax forwards to Tokyo, but rarely benefit from public services to the same degree as do 
Tokyo's residents. It is hence argued that control variables related to population parameters 
would fail to accurately reflect either the scale or the substance of the expenditures made by 
the Tokyo local governments. Therefore, FTE staff is considered to be a more accurate proxy 
for local government municipal scale in the Tokyo metropolis.  
With respect to specification (1) and (2), we stratify each of the specifications into two 
groups (23 wards and 26 cities) and observe how the different fiscal arrangements across the 
two groups affect the volatility of local spending (please see Table 1 for disaggregated 
                                                          
2 In Japan, 6.3% and 1.7% of the consumption tax pool go to both national and local governments, respectively. 
These tax rates are preset before collection of the tax, which isin advance be dforeon of the taxwhich is ifferent 
from some OECDs countries, such as Australia, where- the national government collects the consumption tax 
first, and then reallocate these pools to the lower tiertransfers funds to state governments on the basis of 
horizontal fiscal equalization. In this study, we only took account of the 1.7% consumption tax that is directed 
to local government.  
3 The data of unemployment rate for the municipal level are basically published in 5 year interval. 








summary statistics). The summary statistics suggest that local spending volatility in the 
special wards is relatively higher than for the cities. Regarding local revenue compositions, 
while local tax for the 23 wards is more volatile than for 26 cities, income from consumption 
tax and other taxes in both areas are relatively stable. This is because the central part of the 
local tax is composed of corporation tax, to which most of Japan's large corporations located 
in the special wards or the Central Business Districts contribute. The corporation tax 
fluctuates according to corporation income, which is vulnerable to the business cycle. Hence, 
the local tax in the special wards seems less stable.  For grants, the volatility in the special 
wards is lower than that of the cities. Moreover, the volatility of subsidies supplied to the 
special wards are somewhat higher than that of the cities, but the volatility of fees and 
charges in the special wards are quite stable relative to the cities. The volatilities of the two 
remaining revenues ̶ other revenues and local bonds ̶ are considerably higher in the special 
wards. In sum, the magnitude of volatility is quite disparate between the two groups when it 
comes to local tax, grants, other revenues, and local bonds.  
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4. Research Results and Findings 
Turning first to Table 2 Model 1, which refers to the specification (1) for the entire Tokyo 
municipal cohort, we can see that local expenditure volatility was statistically significant and 
positively associated with the volatilities of other taxes, other revenues, and local bonds, but 
negatively associated with the volatility that of grants. However, as we have outlined the two 
systems of Tokyo local governments are very different in both their revenue streams and 
remits, thus it is necessary to stratify the regression into special wards (Model 2) and cities 
(Model 3), respectively.  
When we do so, we find that, in Model 2, the statistically significant and positive 
explanatory variables for the special wards are volatilities of local tax (β=0.193, p<0.10), 
subsidies (β=0.173, p<0.05), other revenues (β=0.022, p<0.001), and local bonds (β=0.082, 
p<0.05). Specifically, the volatility of public spending is associated with an increase of 
19.3% for an additional one standard deviation in volatility of local taxes, reflecting the 
critical role of special ward local tax, rather than the consumption tax and other taxes, in 
financing expenditures. Next, a change of one standard deviation in the volatility of subsidies 
is associated with an increase in expenditure volatility of around 17.3%, ceteris paribus. For 
the other revenues, the local expenditure volatility is expected to increase by just 2.2% in 
response to a one standard deviation increase in other revenues. Next, a 1% increase in the 
volatility of local bonds is associated with a mere 0.08% increase in volatility of local 
expenditure and implies that local bonds have little effect on public spending. It is also 
important to note that the volatility of grants has a significantly negative association with the 
volatility of local spending (β=-0.704, p<0.001). Thus, a 1% increase in the volatility of 
grants is associated with a relatively strong response of 0.7% (decrease) in the volatility of 
local spending, ceteris paribus. This result does not support the common pool theory, being 
and is inconsistent with the findings of Sacchi and Salotti (2017). In general, it is expected 
that local governments municipalities will increase their expenditures in response to offerings 






special wards. In this sense, they differ from other Japanese municipalities to induce grants 
by expanding expenditure (Bessho & Ogawa, 2015; Martin-Rodiguez & Ogawa, 2017). To 
provide further illumination we present additional analysis in the subsection.  
In Model 3, we found evidence of statistically significant positive associations for 
consumption tax (β=0.093, p<0.05), other taxes (β=0.267, p<0.001), and other revenues 
(β=0.062, p<0.01) concerning the local expenditure volatility in the cities. Specifically, our 
results suggest that increases in the volatility of consumption tax volatility of 1%, are 
associated with local spending increases of just 0.09%. For other taxes, a 1% increase in 
volatility is expected to lead to a relatively strong response of 0.26% increase in the volatility 
of local spending. We can see that compared to the consumption tax, fluctuations to other 
taxes (e.g., golf course tax, vehicle tax) tend to elicit a stronger expenditure response by local 
governments. By virtue of cities being located in the suburban areas, where land is more 
available for development of recreational facilities (e.g., golf courses) and transportation 
infrastructure, then expenditures for these public works are significantly higher and are 
financed by other taxes.  Next, the volatility of local spending volatility is associated with an 
increase of 6.2% for every additional one standard deviation in the volatility of other 
revenues.  
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Our results confirm that there are clear differences between the two local systems of local 
government in Tokyo. In terms of positive and statistically significant associations, special 
wards are associated with local taxes, subsidies, other revenues, and local bonds while cities 
are associated with consumption tax, other taxes and other revenues. The positive 
relationship between the volatility of various kinds of taxes and that of local spending seems 
to fit with the findings of Sacchi and Salotti (2017). However, the negative association 
between the volatility of grants and local spending found in the special wards (but not in the 
cities) seems inconsistent with much of the literature. Moreover, the associations with 
volatility of subsidies and local bonds (with respect to public spending) in the special wards 
is significant at the conditional level, but this pattern does not appear in cities. Finally, in 
both areas, we found evidence of a positive association between the volatility of other 
revenues and that of public spending. It might be argued that both types of local governments 
can utilize other revenues, whose principal part is the saving of money from the previous 
year, as a possible policy instrument to stabilise local public spending volatility. 
In addition to the parsimonious specification (1), the literature presents a strong prima 
facie case to suggest that local government size may affect the volatility of both revenues and 
expenditures (Sacchi & Salotti, 2017). Therefore in Table 3, we repeat our estimations with 
the addition of our size proxy (FTE staff). Turning first to Table 3 Model 4, positive 
statistically significant associations persist between the volatility of local spending and other 
taxes, other revenues, and local bonds. Moreover, the volatility of expenditures is still 
negatively associated with the volatility of grants for the entire Tokyo  municipality local 
government cohort. In general, the magnitude of the coefficients attenuates only slightly 









We also stratified specification (2) and report same in Table 3 Model 5 for the special 
wards and Model 6 for the cities. In Model 5, statistically significant associations persist 
between the volatility of local spending and those of subsidies (β=0.164, p<0.05), other 
revenues (β =0.023, p<0.001), local bonds (β=0.084, p<0.05), and grants (β=-0.707, 
p<0.001). Once again, despite the inclusion of local government size variable, the magnitude 
of coefficients attenuates only slightly. Similarly, we found with Model 6, that statistically 
significant associations persisted for consumption tax (β=0.093, p<0.05), other taxes 
(β=0.267, p<0.001), and other revenues (β=0.062, p<0.01)), and the size of the coefficients 
attenuated only slightly.  
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Further evidence on grants 
To delve further into the negative association between volatility of local spending and 
grants of the special wards, local spending volatility and grant volatility in the special wards, 
we conduct additional analysis as follows. In general, intergovernmental grants transferred 
from TMG to the special wards rely on the fiscal gap between basic fiscal needs and basic 
fiscal revenues. Hence, the intergovernmental relationship is a crucial issue in grant 
allocation, and there appears to be a constant tension between competing objectives of the 
special wards and TMG respectively. From the perspective of the special wards, the 
emphasis tends to be on expanding basic fiscal needs, by incorporating expected 
expenditures, to maximize the grants received, while basic fiscal revenues derived from fixed 
percentages of some principal taxes are relatively unchangeable. However, from the 
perspective of TMG, the main focus is on constraining growth in grant distributions. 
When excluding the grants, basic fiscal revenues reflect 39.5 percentage of actual 
revenues, and they are significantly correlated with a coefficient of 0.898 (the t-test value is 
=28.54), whereas basic fiscal needs account for 59.5 percentage of actual expenditures, less 
than transfers to reserve funds, and their correlation coefficient is significant with a 
coefficient of 0.987 (the t-test value is =28.01). This suggests that the gap between the basic 
fiscal revenues and actual revenues is greater than that of the basic fiscal needs and actual 
expenditures. Hence, expected deficits to be covered by grants seem to be overestimated, as 
compared with the actual deficits. It therefore seems possible for special wards to save funds 
from grants, creating a significant amount of surplus.  
[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
The special wards do not seem to be disposed to expanding local spending despite strong 
surpluses. Perhaps this reticence arises because of previous experiences such as when the 
local tax revenues of TMG plummeted by 20% in 2009 as a result of the GFC in 2008 GFC. 
Consequently, TMG lost around JPY 1 trillion, suffering fiscal difficulties, which also 
brought about a significantly reduced pool for grant distribution. Indeed, the special wards’ 
grants decreased by around 15% in 2009 as a response to the reduction in local taxes 









similar sudden decreases associated with future unpredictable shocks. If this is the case, then 
what we observe may be a rational response by the authorities of special wards to accumulate 
surpluses by saving a certain part of the grants. Our analysis suggests that, over the period 
2010-2015, the surplus per expenditure by the special wards (3.92%) was higher than that of 
the cities (3.22%) (Figure 2). There is a significant difference between the two systems (the t-
test value is= 3.77). Also, the authorities of the special wards tend to prefer to accumulate 
reserve funds for non-specific purposes (e.g., reserve funds can be withdrawn to compensate 
for future income shortages). The ratio of reserve funds per expenditure for the special wards 
is around four times higher than it is for the cities (Figure 3). Indeed, by 2015 preserved 
reserves for special wards (JPY 128 billion) were over six times greater than those of cities 
(JPY 19 billion). There is also a significant difference between the two systems (the t-test 
value is =9.58). It can be inferred that special wards tend to finance their expenditure by 
using tax revenues and other revenues rather than grants, which are saved for reserve funds. 
In sum, this data seems to point to the special wards directing expanded grant revenues to 
reserves as a way of insulating against future financial shocks, rather than responding with 
higher levels of local expenditure. 
[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
It should be noted that the policy for grant allocation was revised by TMG in 2007. Prior 
to 2007, the fixed percentage of grant allocation was 52%, in which 98% was for ordinary 
grants and the remaining 2% for special grants. However, the former ratio was increased to 
55% while the latter decreased to 95% (Ohsugi, 2011), leading to an increase in the entire 
quantum of funds available because a tax collection of 1 yen contribute to the increase of the 
funds for the grant allocation from 152%98% (0.5096 yen) to 155%95% (0.5225 yen). 
TMG thus became more flexible in fiscal adjustments dealing with horizontal fiscal balances 
for special wards. In view of the saving tendency of the special wards (as identified above), 
TMG is considered to be in a better position to control the special wards’ spending volatility 
through the fiscal adjustments made by grant allocations.  
In this study, we examined the association between local expenditure volatility and the 
volatilities of various revenues for the Tokyo local governments through panel data covering 
the period 2010-2015. The evidence confirms that there are distinct differences in the 
determinants of volatility between the special wards and the cities due to the different fiscal 
systems. A number of public policy implications arise from our major findings. 
First, local tax volatility was found to be positively associated with local expenditure 
volatility in the special wards and a similar association was determined for the volatility of 
consumption tax and other taxes with respect to the volatility of local spending in the cities. 
It might be generalised that local expenditures become volatile when they are financed by tax 
revenues. This finding is somewhat congruous with the extant study of Sacchi and Salotti 
(2017), who argued that the volatility of local public spending is positively associated with 
the volatilities of income tax and consumption tax arguing that there are positively significant 
linkages between volatility of local expenditure and that of various own sources (local tax 












might be necessary for the local governments to control the volatilities of these tax-revenues 
by placing a focus on tax bases, that are less volatile, such as property tax rather than income 
taxes (Oates, 2011; Afonso, 2017).  
Second, ordinary grants volatility had a statistically significant negative association with 
local expenditure volatility in the special wards. It implies that the response to greater 
volatility of ordinary grants is lower volatility in local spending. The evidence suggests that 
the special wards may be exercising anticipatory resilience concerning future economic 
shocks (Steccolini et al., 2017). Specifically, the special wards have attempted to accumulate 
reserves from the source of ordinary grants in the aftermath of the GFC, while making an 
effort to maintain public expenditures at a certain level. This finding argues against much of 
the existing literature which tends to suggest that provision of intergovernmental grants 
exacerbate local government spending (Sacchi & Salotti, 2017; Martin-Rodriguez & Ogawa, 
2016; Bessho & Ogawa, 2015). Given this evidence of a saving tendency amongst special 
wards, TMG might respond by increasing the weight to the grant allocation (while 
maintaining subsidies) and thus mitigate spending volatility. Moreover, the practice of 
accumulating reserves could put the special wards in a dilemma: If ordinary grants (95%) for 
non-earmarked expenditures are overestimated with the intention of preserving part of same 
for future contingencies, then this may result in the special grant quantum (5%) being 
insufficient to cover specific purpose expenditures, such as disaster recovery. To cope with 
this possible antinomy, TMG needs to either transfer some funds from ordinary grants to 
special wards where there is a surplus of the former and an insufficient of the latter or to 
make the allocation rate between ordinary and special grants for purposes in special wards 
flexible where appropriate. In so doing, TMG could exert influence over special ward 
spending (stabilization) as well as achieve a more efficient allocation of the grants (to attain 
horizontal fiscal equalisation) among the local governments. Moreover, TMG might 
strengthen its justification with respect to the raison d'etre of tax collection on behalf of the 
special wards without being reconciled to tax reduction.  
ThirdFinally, local bonds of special wards have a statistically significant positive impact 
on expenditure volatility, although the magnitude of the association is relatively small. 
Several municipalities can utilise bonds as fiscal adjustments to redress short-run deficits. 
However, the result suggests that a side-effect of this practice might be to exacerbate local 
spending volatility. Therefore, this suggests that careful consideration of trade-off issues 
between costs and benefits should be made before the bonds are issued.  
Finally, the methodology outlined in this paper would be suitable for studies abroad and 
examining expenditure volatility in other contexts would allow scholars to identify the effect 
of different revenue structures. In particular, comparative analyses with jurisdictions such as 
Australia which operate distinct intergovernmental grant transfer systems would allow 
scholars to further explore the importance of grants as a determinant of expenditure volatility. 
As similar to our focus on the distinction of revenue and public service provisions' structures 
between the urban (special wards) and suburban area (cities), a further potential of 
researching on the case of New South Wales  ̶  a sister city of Tokyo  ̶  should seek to the fiscal difference between the Greater Sydney and rural areas.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics of 23 special wards and 26 cities 
Variables 23 special wards (n =92) 26 cities (n = 104) 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable        
Expenditure  3.973 5.098 0.0174 31.77 3.539 2.256 0.119 10.741 
Independent variables        
Local tax  1.610 1.277 0.250 7.768 1.176 0.837 0.0008 3.888 
Consumption tax  8.856 10.640 0.150 32.525 11.080 12.461 0.111 33.106 
Other taxes 14.959 7.835 1.477 27.882 12.426 6.256 0.166 26.117 
Special grants 40.672 8.934 24.055 68.044 28.95 9.899 8.949 55.659 
Grants 6.562 13.012 0.254 81.4182 70.736 152.491 0.838 783.317 
Subsidies 6.145 5.468 0.473 28.166 5.940 5.014 0.262 21.613 
Fees and charges  2.389 1.573 0.158 9.057 3.679 4.231 0.144 25.524 
Other revenues 25.36 27.082 2.595 150.615 8.269 4.410 0.079 19.927 
Local bonds 330.31 1366.55 0.000 8237.91 35.655 28.624 0.158 139.014 
Control variables        
FTE 2478.576 1011 901 4856 787.644 524.437 310 2656 
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Table 2. Results of the parsimonious model with FE 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Total expenditure (ln)  (Special wards) (Tama cities) 
    
Local tax  0.0990 0.1930+ -0.0659 
 (0.0698) (0.1021) (0.0892) 
Consumption tax (ln) 0.0667+ 0.1512 0.0935* 
 (0.0395) (0.0949) (0.0385) 
Other taxes (ln) 0.2182** 0.2452 0.2670*** 
 (0.0766) (0.1660) (0.0697) 
Special grants -0.0216 -0.0123 0.0106 
 (0.0167) (0.0360) (0.0186) 
Grants (ln) -0.4081** -0.7039*** -0.0709 
 (0.1301) (0.1943) (0.1607) 
Subsidies 0.0206 0.1729* -0.0004 
 (0.0216) (0.0791) (0.0187) 
Fees and charges (ln) 0.0140 0.0607 -0.1276 
 (0.0899) (0.1703) (0.0935) 
Other revenues 0.0216*** 0.0221*** 0.0620** 
 (0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0202) 
Local bonds (ln) 0.0729** 0.0821* 0.1401 
 (0.0273) (0.0335) (0.0903) 
    
Observations 196 92 104 
Coefficient of Determination 0.6116 0.7285 0.5736 
n 49 23 26 
Note: Significant level are  *** p< 0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. The denote (ln) represents the natural 













Table 3. Results of FE models with government size 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Total expenditure (ln)  (Special wards) (Tama cities) 
    
Local tax  0.1062 0.1932+ -0.0654 
 (0.0698) (0.1029) (0.0911) 
Consumption tax (ln) 0.0675+ 0.1486 0.0934* 
 (0.0394) (0.0960) (0.0388) 
Other taxes (ln) 0.210** 0.2376 0.2667*** 
 (0.0766) (0.169) (0.0706) 
Special grants -0.0203 -0.0117 0.0106 
 (0.0167) (0.0363) (0.0188) 
Grants (ln) -0.4127** -0.7068*** -0.0708 
 (0.1298) (0.196) (0.1619) 
Subsidies 0.0202 0.1639* -0.0003 
 (0.0215) (0.0849) (0.0189) 
Fees and charges (ln) 0.0076 0.0699 -0.1279 
 (0.0897) (0.1742) (0.0945) 
Other revenues 0.0221*** 0.0225*** 0.0618** 
 (0.0033) (0.0042) (0.0212) 
Local bonds (ln) 0.0778** 0.0839* 0.1404 
 (0.0275) (0.0342) (0.0918) 
FTE (ln) -4.5505 -2.5894 -0.1077 
 (3.3702) (8.3743) (3.1352) 
    
Observations 196 92 104 
Coefficient of Determination 0.6167 0.7289 0.5736 
n 49 23 26 
Note: Significant level are ***p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. The denote (ln) represents the natural 





Figure 1. The TMG Local Taxes and Grants for Special Wards from 2000 to 2010 




Figure 2. The ratio of surplus per expenditure between special wards and cities 
 
Figure 3. The ratio of reserve funds per expenditure between special wards and cities 
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